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ON MAXIMIZING THIRD WORLD BENEFITS FROM MINERAL RESOURCES 
by Ann s~.d dman 
I am grateful for the invitation to participate in this 
International Symposium on ''Strategies for Exploitation of 
Schools like yours 
will undoubtedly play a key role in devising new strategies for 
exploiting mineral resources as a foundation for building 
self-reliant, integrated development capable of providing 
productive employment opportunities and raising the living 
standards of third world peoples. I welcome this opportunity 
to share information and ideas. 
THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM: 
At this symposium, I need not dwell on the nature of the 
hi storical ly-shaped problems confronting minerally-based 
E:ccmomi es today . You are all as aware as I as to the way, for 
centuries, foreign firms employed local labor at low wages to 
mine third world countries' rich minerals and ship them for 
processing to their factories back home (e.g., A. Seidman, 1975) . 
The parent companies based in western industrialized centers not 
only owned they mines. They also manufactured mining equipment 
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and machinery? and handled the marketing and processing of the 
mines output for the final consumers. 
The peoples of host countries benefitted little from the 
multiplier effects promised by mainstream economists. 
Enclave-like mine development generated few backwards or forwards 
linkages to other sectors of the national economy. Only a small 
fraction of t h e national labor force obtained even low paid jobs 
on the mines -- and in recent years increasingly 
capital - intensive mechanization has reduced that fraction. Few 
workers learned the skills needed to manage the mines? far less 
increase productivity in other sectors of the national economy. 
And the companies remitted a major share of the profits to their 
home countries -- in small countries like Zambia and Namibia as 
much as 25 to 40 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
leaving behind little capital to start other productive 
activities. The host countries spent the little foreign 
exchange they earned for their mineral exports to import high 
priced manufactures for those few who could afford to buy them. 
When the world prices for crude minerals fell? the foreign mine 
companies simply laid off workers and cut back production -- and 
crises spread through the national economies. 
After World War II, nationalist movements held out the hope 
that independence would assure a greater share of the benefits 
from their countries' minerals. But? as we all know too well? 
their bright dreams dashed on the rocks cf the harsh reality. 
Even when newly independent national governments acquired shares 
in their countries' mines, seeking to take over the management 
and capture the investable surpluses gen erated, the majority of 
their peoples benefitted little. 
By the late 1970s and early '80s, the international crisis, 
engulfing most third world mining economies , exposed their 
relative lack of success in contributing to greater national 
welfare. In the face of relatively inelastic demand, their 
competition ta expand the mines'output, together with the 
introduction of substitute products, pushed down world mineral 
prices. They borrowed heavily abroad at high rates of interest 
to cover the on-going costs of their expanding bureaucracies, 
social services and other _development programs. As Table I 
shows, debt serv ice payments began to consume an increasing share 
of their foreign exc hang e earnings. The International Monetary 
Fund <IMF>, in return for its assistance, imposed an austerity 
package that typically contributed to growing unemployment, 
reduced social services, and falling real incomes <A. Seidman, 
1986a; Makgetla, forthcoming>. At the same time, the IMF 
pressured their governments to halt even the limited 
'interference' through which they had sought to augment their 
mining sectors' contribution to national welfare. 
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Table I: EXTERNAL DEBT OF SELECTED MINING ECONOMIES 
i n millions of U.S. dollars and as percent of GDP 
1970 and 1983 
Country External public debt 
<millions of dollar s > as percent of GDP 
1970 1983 1970 1983 
Bolivia 479 2,969 ~~ ~~- 8 77. 
Chile 2,066 6,827 ~~ LJ. 8 39. 
Guinea 314 1 ,216 47. 4 69. 
Jamaica 160 1 ,950 l 1 . 8 65. 
Liberia 158 699 49. 6 72. 
Papua New Guinea 36 91 l ~ J. 8 40. 
Peru 856 7,932 12. 6 48. 
Zaire 311 4,022 17. 6 91 
" 
Zambia 623 2638 37. 0 83. 
Source~ World Bank Annual Develop ment Report , 1986 
<New York: Oxford University Press? 1986>. 
The question is, why? How can developing countries devise 
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effective measures to ensure their mineral wealth contributes 
more to spreading increasingly productive employment 
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opportunities and rising living standards for their peoples? 
AN EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESIS: 
I would like to suggest an hypothesis to explain why so often 
in the past, despite bold declarations at independence, 
developing countries have failed to attain their proposed goals. 
To the extent that it is valid, it suggests an agenda for the 
kind of research needed to design more successful policy measues. 
My hypothesis comprises two basic propositions. First? 
despite their declared determination to exert greater national 
control over their mining sector s , most post-independence 
governments largely left intact colonial-shaped institutional 
structures that delegated primary decision-making power to 
foreign mining firms. In the context of the post World War II 
technological revolution that multiplied the capital cost of 
mining machinery and equipment, transnational corporations 
asserted even more concentrated control over international 
sources of mining capital, technology, managerial personnel and 
markets (Seidman and Makget la, 1980). Despite nationalist 
governments' marginal changes in national institutions, these 
s till functioned primarily to replicate inherited patterns of 
mining investment. They left the host economies dependent on 
crude low-cost mineral exports directly or indirectly controlled 
by a handful of transnat ional mining conglomerates. 
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If valid, this first proposition focuses attention on the need 
to investigate alternative ways of exerting more effective 
national control over mining sector institutions. 
The second proposition contends that, even where they 
succeeded in exerting a degree of national control over mining 
sector institutions, most governments failed adequately to plan 
th e integration of the mining sector into national development. 
Too often, the mines continued to expand as e nclaves, aggravating 
the dualistic external dependence of the national economy while 
underdevelopment persistently impoverished the mass of their 
populations. 
If valid, this second proposition argues for governments to 
formulate and implement plans to integrate the mining sector into 
all aspects of their longterm industrial strategies. Only 
then can they ensure the nation's mineral wealth will contribute 
more effectively to the people's welfare . 
To subst antiate this hypothesi s, I will summarize the evidence 
as to why, first, third world governments did not more 
successful l y exert nationa l control over the mining sectors; and, 
second, they failed to incorporate the min es adequately into 
their overall development strategies. 
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1. Government efforts to exert national control: 
For this audience, I will not waste time debating time- worn 
mythologies about whether a government should intervene in the 
We all know no markets can exist 
Governments always intervene, either directly or by allocating 
decisions to private actors <R. B. Seidman, 1978). They ~; hapE· 
the framework and define the conditions within which private 
11 mc\l'" ket f Ol~C(;,)~5 11 f l..ll'1Ct i On n The fundamental issue is, not whether 
the government should intervenw, but how? To what institutions, 
and und er what circumstances, should govern~ent as 
p o litically-organized society's only instrument for social change 
(Chambliss and Seidman, 1982) -- allocate decisions relating to 
the mines in order to achieve national development goals? 
Newly independent governments devised various measures to 
enhance national control over their mining sectors <A. Seidman, 
1975) • Many aimed primarily to increase the government 's share 
of the invest.able surp lus generated by the mines to finance their 
development plans. Some sought improved worker training, 
:I .• I will not., he1'·e .1 d:i.~>cu.ss the critical issue of V-Jhic:h 
interest s , in a given society, the state itself represents; 
self-evidently, however, if it does not represent those groups 
that stand to gain, it will not pursue policies or reshape 
institutions in ways likely to achieve more balanced, integrated 
development .. 
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processing of the crude minerals before export, and the creation 
of backwards and forwards linkages with the rest of the economy. 
To explain why these efforts so frequently failed to achieve 
governments' declared goals, however, requires analysis of the 
behavior of those managing the mine companies in the context of 
the decision-making structures that shaped policies relating to 
key issues like~ Which deposits to mine? How many workers to 
employ and what to pay them? Whether to use labor or 
capital-intensive technologies? Whether to encourage local 
manufacture of machinery, equipment and component parts or to 
import them, and how much to pay for them (including whether to 
pay high prices to overseas affiliates to transfer profits, 
undetectedi out of the host country)? How much to produce in any 
given period? To what companies and at what price to sell the 
output? 
How the responsible personel behave in formulating decisions 
in response to a new government directive depends on many 
factors. These include whether they receive and fully comprehend 
the directive; whether, given objective constraints, they have 
the capacity to conform; whether they consider it compatible with 
2. Studies concerning what determines the behavior of relevant 
individuals in response to new laws have systematized these 
factors under the mneumonic, ROCCIPI~ Given a Rule, do they have 
the Opportunity to obey? has the rule been adequately 
Communicated to them? do they have the Capacity and do they 
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As in all l arge private and public institutions, the input, 
conversion and feedback processes that characterise th e mining 
firms' decision-making structures influence the behavior of the 
key policy makers. The input processes include the channels 
that determine the kind s of issues and information the decision 
makers consi dc?.r. Historically, in third world mining sectors, 
t~ansnational corporateengineers 7 marketing experts and managers 
decided through which channels to obt a in these inputs. 
The conversion processes cons i s t of the institution's internal 
standard operating rules and procedures <c.f. Allison, 1970 ) 
which determine which decision-makers -- e.g., boards of 
directors, managers or technical experts -- make particular 
decisions and by what criteria. In the past, in the typical 
third world mining economy, company managers, rather than board 
members, made the crucial day-to-day decisions in accord with 
overarchi ng operative critera relating to maximizing the parent 
firm's global profits. 
The feedback processes govern whether or not and through which 
channels t hose affected by a particular policy may express their 
perceive obedience to 
decision-making Process 
Ideologies, their values 
<See R.B. Seidman, 1978> 
be in thei 1·-
thei 1~ 
and at.t.:i.tudes 7 
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Interest? Does the 
obedience? Do their 
support conformance? 
r-·0?i:\c:tion to it. Traditionally, in the typical mining sector, 
these permitted responses primarily from top managerial 
personnel, financial institutions, and parent corporations, as 
well as price signals from world markets. Hi e1~an::hi cal 
managerial structures typically excluded workers' f~~edback, 
leaving them little choice but to rely on demostrations and 
strikes to protest particular policies they opposed. Small 
national business interests and even host governments had limited 
access to corporate policy makers. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION-MAKING WITHIN AN 
INSTITUTIDN: 
INPUT Pl=t:OCl:::SSES: 
determine who sup-
counts as l.._nputs 
-----./-. ,.; . - I 
!"....., 
CDN',/ERS I ON 
PROCESSES: 
tu1"·n <:: inputs ,:;.nd 
f f2<·:;~db;ac: ks; into 
d<?.c: i si ems 
FEEDBACK PROCESSES 
-
I 
...-· 
OUTPUTS: 
policy decis-
ions and thei 1·-
:implementation 
J / 
/ 
Note~ Baratz and Bachrach <1970> criticised Dahl's 
original model <1961> as static. This model attempts 
to introduce more dynamic features by emphasizing, not 
particular inputs, feedbacks and outputs, but processes 
and the range of outputs <see R.B. Seidman, 1978>. 
...• :I. 0 --
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The decision-making model in Diagram I may help to understand 
the way the decision-making processes in large institutions 
function to influence policies. 
In this brief talk, I will try to show that analysis of the 
major factors influencing key individuals' behavior within the 
relevant decision-making institutions help s to explain the newly 
independent governments' relative lack of success in acheiving 
their goals despite their efforts to implement several kinds of 
policy measures. These include attempts to: 1) capture the 
investable surplus directly; 2) acquire shares of ownership to 
increase their share of profits and influence mine development; 
3) create government mining corporations to implement proposed 
policies; and 4> establish mineral marketing boards. 
In examining each category, I will, first, make explicit the 
underl yi ng, but frequently unstated premises; and then summarize 
the evidence as to the policy's impact on the inherited 
decision-making institutions in relation to the newly-formulated 
national goals. 
a. Direct efforts to capture the investable surpluses: 
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As its underlying premise, this approach assumes as given the 
inherited constitutional framework that delegates mine ownership 
to private (frequently foreign> firms. It accepts, however, that 
governments may introduce laws to capture a greater share of the 
profits for the nation through various devices, including taxes, 
increased minimum wages, the introduction of development bonds, 
and more effective exchange controls. Several factors hindered 
the introduction of these kinds of laws. Among these, 
conventional wisdom, reinforced by international agencies like 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, argued that 
such measures not only discouraged additional investment by 
existing firms, but also frightened away other potential 
investors (e.g. World Bank, 1981). 
Moreover, this approach leaves the existing input, conversion 
and feedback processes intact in the hands of transnational 
corporate mining managers, whose careers primarily depend on 
maxmizing their parent companies' global profits. They often 
respond to new laws in ways that limit the anticipated benefits 
to the nation: First, they may manipulate the local mine 
company's financial arrangements to reduce the apparent profits 
generated by the mines, thus reducing the national tax base. For 
example, they may pay higher prices for inputs imported from, or 
charge lower prices for minerals exported to overseas affiliates, 
thus transferring a significant share of their profits out of the 
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country. Or they may borrow funds from affiliated financial 
institutions to finance their mining operations, paying them a 
major share of their profits in the form of interest. Such 
payments are typically not taxed or taxed a relatively low rates 
<Murray , 1981; Brundenius, 1975>. 
Second, the managers may pursue variou s production policies 
that disadvantage the national economy. They may import 
capital-intensive technologies, rather than encourage domestic 
manufacture, reducing the numbers of workers employed. They may 
mine more easily-reached valuable deposits to increase short-term 
profits after the taxes, leaving untouched marginal mineral 
reserves that, unless mined along with the richer deposits, will 
never be viable (Ffrench-Davis, 1975). 
Third, transnational corporations may utilize their 
international marketing networks to reduce output in the country 
where taxes are high, while expanding it in those providing more 
favorable conditions. When Manley 's government raised taxes on 
the bauxite mining firms in Jamaica, the transnational aluminium 
companies shifted their purchases to Australian and New Guinean 
mines, threatening Jamaican employment and incomes <Payne, 
1984a). Where transnationals have been able to expand output in 
new areas, or have developed substitutes , efforts to create 
producer associations to coordinate member countries' output and 
prices to maximize national returns have failed (for the case of 
- 13 -
copper, see Takeuchi, 1975; Metzger, 1975>3. 
In short, governments' direct measures to capture the mines' 
investable surplus for national welfare have tended to fail 
because they left the transnational mining companies in control 
of the key operational decisions. 
b. Government acquisition of shares: 
Those advocating government acquisition of a share of the 
ownership of the national mines tended to assume this would 
automatically ensure government received an equivilent share of 
the mining profits. Government ownership of a majority of 
shares, furthermore, would enable it to direct mining operations 
along lines more beneficial to the nation. 
Advocates of this position sometimes argue that the foreign 
firm has long drained prof its more than equal its original 
investment, so the government may take over its local assets 
without paying for them (e.g. Chile under Allende). To avoid the 
danger of international sanctions, however, host governments more 
typically pay compensation, often in the form of a percentage of 
3. The most successful producer association, OPEC, now confronts 
tumbling prices in part because transnationals, with major 
assistance from their home country governments, have been able to 
expand output in non-OPEC member countries. 
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future profits. As Zambia discovered when it purchased a 
majority of the shares of its mines, however, this may consume a 
signf icant portion of the investable surplus the mine generates 
(Sharma, 1976). 
Unfortunately, acquisition of shares, even a majority 
of shares, does not ensure the government will receive an 
equivalent share of profits, far less control mining and 
marketing operations. Even in developed countries, it has long 
been recognized that establi s hment of boards of directors 
separates share owners from the corporate managers' daily 
decision-making processes <Berle and Means, 1933). In developing 
countries, where past company policies have denied nationals 
essential managerial skills, governments frequently negotiate 
ma nagement contracts with the transnational mining company (e.g. 
Passara, 1976; Ushewokunze, 1975>. Transnational corporate 
managers thus continue to control the input, conversion and 
feedback processes that govern the local mining firms' 
policy decisions. In co-operation with remote head offices, they 
can easil y manipulate price and profit decisions to reduce 
government's profit share. After Zambia's government acquired 51 
percent of the shares of the two mining companies that dominate 
4. The transnational parent of one, the Anglo American Group, 
constituted the leading mining finance house in South Africa, 
with close ties to both British and U.S. financial and mining 
interests. Its investments spread throughout the independent 
countries of southern Africa. The other, a U.S. firm, American 
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the nation al c0?conom'~ f 01r· e:-: amp l fi:~, the costs; of 
operating the mines unaccountably jumped 20 percent, reducing the 
government's profit share by an equivalent amount. 
Furthermore, overworked government directors typically have 
neither the knowledge nor the opportunity to influence 
day-to-day decisions of the mining company's 
the mine managers for the engineering data and financial 
information that determines their decisions as to which deposits 
to mine; the technologies to use and the prices paid for them; 
the numbers and wages of workers employed; whether or not and how 
much to borrow abraod, and the rates of interest paid; and even 
the amounts of minerals to market and where and a what prices to 
~;:;e l]. thE1m. Moreover, the managers control the operative 
conversion processes relating to many day-to-day decisions that 
never reach the boards of directors. Typically, they also 
control the feedback processes. Few government representatives 
have the opportunity to talk directly to small local businesses 
that could have provided spare parts or components that managers 
Metal Climax <AMAX>, also had extensive investments, frequently 
in c lose collaboration with the Anglo American Group in Southern 
Africa, as well as the Americas (Seidman and Makgetla, 1980). 
5. Sometimes one minister or 
or more boards of companies in 
CR.B.Seidman, 1978). 
permanent secretary will sit on 15 
which the government holds shares 
ordered, instead, from abroad. Nor do they have much occasion to 
hear personnaly from workers who object to managerment decisions 
concerning wages and working conditions. Finally, the company 
managers frequently select and train the nationals who Join the 
management team, and may convince them to adopt company, rather 
than national, perspectives and methods of operation. 
It is small wonder that, in recent years, transnational 
corporate managers have even come to welcome third world 
governments' acquisition of shares in their local affiliates 
(e.g. Silitshena, 1975). The government thus helps to finance 
the mines' operations, and will _ more likely favor company needs 
for foreign exchange or in dealing with mine workers ' demands for 
better wages and working conditions. 
~. Government corporations: 
To acquire greater control, some governments create state 
corporations to take over the management of the local mining 
company. They also, of course, confront the issue of whether and 
how much compen s ation to pay. Moreover, this attempt to 
establish greater state control has often turned out to be 
illusory. First, unless the government can hire qualified 
nationals, it may still have to negotiate management contracts 
that leave tran s national corporate managers to determine 
day-to-day mining policies. 
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Second, the government often passes legislation that permits 
the state corporation to operate as much as possible like an 
autonomous; pr··ivatf? entet·-prisi;.~ (LJnitE!d Nations, 1974)~. In 
third world mining economies, this may produce an anomalous 
situation in which the state-owned corporation almost constitutes 
a state-within-a-state. Its management not only makes decisions 
that affect the lives of thousands of workers and their families. 
Its policies control a major share of the nation's exports and 
incomes. It may exert a major influence on government policies. 
For a time in Indonesia, for example, the military officer 
heading the government petroleum corporation operated it entirely 
outside government control, amassing assets exceeding those of 
the state. The corporation funnelled funds to has supporters in 
Some observers suggested that he, not the nominal head 
of state, ruled the country CMay, 1978; Crouch, 1978). 
d. Government marketing boards~ 
In an effort to gain greater control over marketing the mining 
sector ' s output, several governments have attempted to set up 
their own marketing agencies. In the mid '70s, Zambia ' s 
6. In former British colonies, the drafters followed the British 
tradition based on the assumption that, unlike civil service 
bureaucratic red tape, private sector initiative in seeking to 
maximize profit stimulated efficiency <R.B. Seidman, 1978). 
government established MEMACO <Metals Marketing Coporation) with 
a London office to handle its mine exports. MEMACO appointed as 
its mareting agents several transnational corporations with which 
it had previously had relationships. These included the South 
African mining finance house, Anglo American, which still owned 
minority shares in the Zambian mines; and two Japanese companies, 
Mitsui and Misubishi, which purchased a major share of the mines· 
output CMEMACO annual reports). 
Zimbabwe's post-independence government -- aware of the high 
cos t and difficulty of asserting national control through direct 
ownership, especially given the existence of many relatively 
small mines -- decided at the outset to create a state marketing 
board to handle mineral exports. Through the board, the 
Ministry of Mines sought to diversify the mines' export markets, 
selling minerals to companies and countries other than those 
linked to the operating transnational affiliatess. In the 
process, the Ministry hoped to obtain a more accurate assessment 
of the value of the minerals sold, and thwart the loss of profits 
through transfer pricing. Over time, the Ministry anticipated 
the board would help to capture a significant share of the 
investable s urplus generated by the mines, as well as to train 
personnel to conduct research, manage, process and market 
mineral s . 
In a compromise designed to soften mining company opposition 
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to the board, however, the Zimbabwe government appointed as the 
marketing board's first manager a man, by the wonderful name of 
Mark Rule, who had played a prominent role in the 
pre- independence government's efforts to evade United Nation' s 
sanctions. Although, in 1985 7 the board reported a profit of 
about a million Zimbabwe dollars 7 only further 
research could assess the extent to which the new board really 
altered the mining firms ' decision-making processes . 
In sum, newly independent governments' efforts to enhance the 
mining sector's contribution to national welfare failed, at least 
in part, because they did not fundamentally change the factors, 
particularly the decision-making structures, shaping the 
responsible managers' policies. 
2. The need for a national development strategy: 
In my opinion, a more impoortant reason for the difficulties 
encountered by post-independence efforts to ensure the mining 
sector contributed more to national welfare lies in the 
governments' failure adequately to address the fundamental issue 
of how to incorporate the mining sector in the overall 
7. A tiny fraction (less than 0.2 percent> of the value of 
nation's mineral exports (Zimbabwe Statistical Abstract, 
1985) 
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the 
Oct. 
development process. Most focused only on parts of the problem: 
How to capture a greater share of the investable surpluses 
generated by the mines; or how to assert greater government 
control over the mines or mineral marketing to increase their 
sales to earn more foreign exchange and revenue. Many spent 
much of the investable surplus they did capture to finance 
expanded social services and economic infrastructure, rather than 
investing in productive activity that, over time, would generate 
greater income and employment. Implicitly, they adopted the 
western orthodoxy that investment in the mines and associated 
infrastructure would initate an automatic multiplier effect, 
spreading increasingly productive employment acti v ities 
throughout the rest of the economy. They neglected investments 
in a whole range of possible productive spin-off activities that 
could have sti mulated more balanced, integrated national 
clevE·?l opmE·nt. 
TD i l lu~::;t1~ 2:1t£-.~ ~ In Zambia, the government seemed to view the 
mining sector as a goose that laid golden eggs. All it had to do 
was collect them to finance its 'humanist' social welfare 
In 1969, when the government took over 51 per~ent of 
the mining companies, the President explain8d that it primarily 
aimed to ensure that they invested to expand the production and 
8. The t1rms had be~n remitting up to 90 percent 
e:i.f t.E:'r-tci :; pr-o-f its; abl'-0<:1.d. 
. .... 2l ·-
of 
!Sal f? crf coppe 1~ .y In its agn~?ement 
with the companies, the government required neither an 
aff irmati ve action program to train local managers, nor 
investment in more advanced st.ages of processing. Instead., it 
went so far as to grant the companies permission to remit, tax 
free, one kwacha for every kwacha invested in expanding copper 
CJutput. The companies simply borrowed money ab road to invest in 
the mines (leaving the government, as a majority-share owner, 
responsible for repaying the debt before receiving any profits), 
and remitted, taxfree, their share of the profits to their parent 
comp an j, t':'S. Government. revenues from the copper mines plummented 
from K235 million in 1969 to K55 million in 1972 <Sharma , 1975). 
Far from contributing to increased nati onal prosperity, the 
resulting expansion of Zambian copper sales -- along with that of 
other third world countries pursuing parallel policies --
predictably contributed to an oversupp ly that pushed world copper 
prices down in a semi-permanent slump. Simply to maintain its 
level of import-dependent development, Zambia's government, like 
those of other mineral-exporting countries, had to borrow heavily 
It turned to the IMF for help. By the beginning of the 
'80s, Zambia had received about a third of the resources the IMF 
made available in all of southern Africa -- and, with them, the 
typical IMF austerity package (Seidman, 1985; Makgetla, 
f 01· .. thcom:i. rHJ) .. Under IMF pressure, the government re-opened the 
economy to South African imports, undermining domestic 
import-substitution industrial production and 
· .. ·1 ··, / · ·· ·t \ c;i / ·rt· .. _, '-'r·· .. c·l1·r· · · ,- ·t· .. , 1·11·1 "'·t· ""·-1 f.:)mp .. (.J :' mf.:.•n . "V l ~-- (-::. ..... un .. 1 ·y ·"' .. r.:. ','j C'. .. ""· t. n Unemployment mounted. F\:i.sing 
prices slashed real incomes CMakgetla, 1985; Mudenda, 1985). 
The governments of Zambia and other mining economies could 
have learned from many years of experience that mining projects 
in third world countries, unlike those established earlier in 
Europe and the United States, seldom automatically stimulate the 
spread of development .. The introduction of the Tata steel 
i ndustry in India, for example, had a different impact from that 
established in the 19th century in the United States. Th(:? U.S. 
steel industry grew in response to the expanding domestic demand 
created first by the railroads, and later by the auto and 
construction industries .. In contrast, extensive i nvestigation 
has r e vea led that for decades the Tata steel industry contributed 
relatively little to increased productivity and rising living 
standards in the s urrounding Jamshedpur region. Rel au. Vf?l y 
self-sufficent neighboring villages provided no market for steel 
9.. Af t er independen c e, the government had encourag e d 
import -substitution indust rialization, acquiring shares in 
manufacturing firms, and providing incentives for ma nagers to 
expand domestic production. As in the case of import 
substitution elsewhere, however, the industries main l y loc ated in 
already-developed a reas along the line-of-rail, produced luxuries 
and semi-luxuries, and depended on imported capital intensive 
mach i nery and equipment that provided relatively little 
employment. Essen tially , in other words, they tended to 
aggravate the nation ' s dualistic, external dependence <Turck, 
l 9!30) .. 
or steel-based products. Local blacksmiths lacked the capital 
and skills to set in motion the development process, generating a 
demand for steel. Moreover, as the steel industry aged, new 
capital ' modernization' expenditures tended to limit rather than 
expand employment. Only after World War II, by providing 
additional employment and creating a steadily expanding demand 
for component parts as well as consumer goods and services, did 
government -assisted expansion of steel-using commercial vehicle 
and machinery manufacture stimulate regional growth <Gupta, 
l 9ff:-::.) • 
The complexity and large s cale of modern technologies 
associated with mining today thwart their potential as poles of 
growth that will automatically foster integrated development 
th1r· ou.(_;jhout th i 1r·d l.-'JDr 1 d r··f?~~ i ans~ The J ams-,hE.1clpu1··· f?:·: pe1·· i (~nc::f:"~ 
underscores the fact that, today, third world efforts to take 
advantage of mining potentials to spur regional development have 
bee:: om(~ 11 i nc::1··(:-?asi ng l y d(:-?penclE·!nt on scic i al act :i. on, policy a11d 
01· .. g.:~. n:i.-:::,:1tim1." (Gupta, 19B ~:) ~1 66). 
This is borne out by the South African case. 
10. For a definition and illustration of the concept of growth 
poles, see Green and Seidman, 1968. Mabogunje, (1978) reviews of 
the theory of growth poles in third world economies, and calls 
for further research concerning their potential role in Africa. 
Gupta (1983) discusses growth pole theory in relation to the Tata 
iron and steel industry. 
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racist regime aggressively exercised state power to spur the 
multiplication of the transnational corporate manufacturing 
investments that transformed that country from a predominantly 
mining economy to an industrialized one, now characterized by the 
intE01,.·naticmal a<JE)nc:iE)S ,':ls "developed" (e.g.Unitecl N.::1.tions 
Statistical Year book ). The apartheid state deliberately coerced 
the black majority into impoverished reserves to provide cheap 
labor for the minority-owned mines, commercial farms and 
fact or· i E0S. But we might ponder the implications of the fact 
that, over the last 25 years, the regime played a crucial role in 
directinq investments, not only by the domestic mining finance 
houses, but also by transnational corporations from all the 
major western nations, to the construction of its modern 
military-industrial complex. Thus the regime strenqthened South 
Africa's capacity as a regional subcenter, enabling it to 
marginalize and exploit, not only its own population, but the 
peoples of the neighboring states (Seidman and Makgetla, 1980). 
To reduce dependence on black labor after the 1976 Soweto 
uprising , the regime deliberately fostered the capital-intensive 
mechanization of mines and agriculture that today has left half 
the black population without land or jobs, starving in fragmented 
scraps of the least fertile, least well-watered 13 percent of the 
n,::1tion ' s li::1nd: the 11 bantust21ns'1 <1~ .. f::)02idman.1 1985). 
winning liberation, the people of South Africa will n eed to study 
these developments, as well as learn from other countries' 
experiences? to create a democratic state and restructure the 
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institutions controlling the mines and other productive 
activities, not to further enrich a minority, but to meet their 
basic needs. 
In short, the available evidence underscores the necessity for 
developing country governments to formulate longterm plans, both 
for improving the pattern of resource allocation which mining 
investment may make possible; and for introducing the essential 
changes in inherited sets of key institutions to implement those 
plans. 
a. Longterm plans for resource development: 
Governments should plan their longterm development strategies 
to incorporate all the potential linkages and spinoffs from the 
mining sector <Tironi, 1975~ A. Seidman, 1975b). These include: 
*The production of building materials and consumer 
goods, including food for the labor force, during the 
construction of the mine works and associated 
infrastructure~ Integrated into on-going plans for 
development of the mining project, these activities 
should contribute to the spread of permanent employment 
opportunities in agriculture and small scale rural 
indus tries. 
*The processing of the mine's output, not only to 
increase its export value, but also to facilitate its 
use in the form of inputs into other sectors of the 
national and regional economy: Iron processed into 
steel may be used for all kinds of building materials 
and manufactured products; copper may be used for 
electric wires and appliances, as well as in brass; 
aluminium made from bauxite provides a durable light 
construction material for many purposes; etc. Planning 
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agnecies should make longterm plans, not only for the 
physical location and technology of these industries, 
but also to provide adequate manpower and finance to 
ensure their realization. 
*The construction infrastructure associated with the 
mining projec to serve a double purpose of fulfilling 
the development needs <including productive ac tivities> 
of the neighboring communities~ Rather than focusing 
so lely on the mine project's needs in selecting and 
building a particular type of infrastructural projects 
-- roads, railroads, bridges, water supply, power, and 
so forth -- planners should also design it to maximize 
their potential stimulation of agriculture and small 
scale industries. 
*The training a nd involvement of the workers at every 
stage and every level to improve their incentives and 
efficiency in increasing productivity~ In particular, 
nationals shou ld learn engineering, accounting, 
marketing a nd the other sk ill s needed to manage every 
aspect of the operation of the mines and associated 
infrastructure in relation to national welf are. The 
semi- and unskilled workers on the mines and associated 
infrastructural projects, too, should receive regular 
on-the -job training and s pecial courses. This should 
enable them, not only to participate more fully in the 
efficient operation of the mines, but also to 
contribute to technological and innovation if they 
later work in other sectors of the national economy. 
*Development of local research and teaching in 
national universities and specialized mining institutes 
like the Indian School of Mines to ensure the nationa l 
economy realizes the full growth pole potential of 
mining projects. Research should not focus only on the 
most appropriate technologies for the mineral's 
extraction, processing~ a nd linkages to the rest of the 
regional and national economy. It s hould investigate 
broader issues like the the conditions of the national, 
regional and world markets and the appropriate 
incentives and conditions to sp ur increased worker 
productivity. Wherever possible, research should 
encourage participation by the min e rs and workers in 
neighboring communities to stimulate the creative 
improvement of their performance and the quality of the 
goods they produce. 
Today, given the economies of sca le characteristic of large 
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mining and associated processing industries, small mining 
economies could more easi l y plan these kinds of linkages if they 
could cooperate with their neighbors. The former colonial rulers 
carved up entire regions into mini-economies without regard to 
et h nic, geographical or economic realities, leaving the 
succeeding indpendent na~ions too small to provide the markets or 
resources needed to create large-scale modern industrial 
devel op11H?nt based on thei 1·- thei ,,. mi. nc=~r .. al re·sources'tJ.I. 
Separately, little mining economies like Zambia's or Jamaica's, 
with low per capita incomes and population s smaller than those of 
a good sized European city, cannot easily escape dependence on 
external markets, tech nologies, and sources of finance dominated 
by transnational firms. This urges research into the 
possibilities of incorporating their national mining sectors into 
reqional strategies for industrialization . 
- 1 . . 12 
of regiona cooperation e x ist. 
Several models 
-·- .. -·-·······-----···---
11. This is true throughout many parts of the world (Green and 
S0?idman, 1968; Salgado, 1978; A:dine.1 1977; Belc.1SS<'":l. and 
Strou.tjesdi..ik, 1977;: Gupta.1 1983; Ballc:.i.nce et al .1 lci82). Even 
larger counttries, like Nigeria, Brazil and India, remain 
constitutionally divided into states whose separate 
administrators structures tend to hinder formulation and 
implmentation of national deve l opment strategies <Kuklinksy, 
1978) u 
12. In the developed world 7 these include the European Economic 
Community <EEC- Demeo, 1984; Franzmeyer , 1983; Hoffman, 1984) and 
the Community for Mutual Economic Assistance CCMEA -Saunders, 
1983; Hoffman, 1984) and, among developing countries, Caricom 
<Harrison, 1967), the Andes Pact <Echeveria et al, 1981), the 
Association of South East Asian Nations <ASEAN - Castro, 1982; 
Ghosh, 1984; >, t h e Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference CSADCC - Thompson, 1985) and the Economic Community 
for West Africa <ECOWAS - Asante, 1984). 
·- 2B ···· 
b. Planning for essential institutional changes~ 
The experience of developing c ountries the world around 
emphasizes that, to realize the planned development of mining 
projects as poles of growth, governments must change the 
inherited institutions that have shaped their past disarticulated 
development. Given the constraints on their available manpower 
and finance, however, they cannot change all of them at once. 
They need to identify priorities. It only makes sense that they 
should start with those institutions that control their nation s ' 
'commanding heights', that is, those with the greatest linkages 
and influence throughout the economy. In particu)~r, this 
implies asserting control over basic industries; export-import 
and internal wholes ale trade; and financial institutions 
<Nyerere, 1967; UN 1974). 
The large potential gains from integrating mining sectors into 
regional industrialization strategies suggest, furthermore, the 
necessity of considering, not only how to alter the institutions 
to increase control over the national commanding heights, but 
simultaneously, how to restructure them to facilitate regional 
cooperation. Evidence shows that formation of common markets 
that leave investment decisions to p~ivate profit maximizing 
enterprise (domestic or foreign), tends to reinforce and 
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aggravate uneven development and perpetuate external dependence 
<Green and Seidman, 1968; Echeveria et al, 1981). 1'101'-eove,,.· , 
newly liberated peoples typically cherish the national identity 
they have won through prolonged struggle. Thf:?i r nation al 
governmental institutions may focus on realizing national 
potentials, implementing policies that may conflict with 
···t·t· - . . . ··t- ··· f .. . , ... n· .. ] .. r • r.;• . t- :] : ·t ... ,-·'1 ~::z c i ... <::ilnfTlt-::f\ .. L! F Egl. .... l\d. ptJ:::>.::>l. .i .L .. !. .. lE.Sv· Th:i.~; suggests 
that, while examining the national economies' commanding heights, 
researchers should also e x plore institutional changes to achieve 
the minimal threshhold of cooperation required to implement an 
effective regional strategy . 
The mines and associated industries , because of their key role 
in producing a major share of a third world mining economy's 
exports, incomes and investable surpluses, as well as their 
potential for stimulating the spread of productivity in all 
sectors of the economy, constitute one of any mining economy's 
11 comm;;·\nding heights. 11 ThE· (·?vidence I have <;iiven r-elc:i.ting to my 
first proposition, however, indicated that, in many if not most 
third world countries, the institutions to which 
post-independence governments delegated the power to manage the 
mines continued to grind out decisions much like those they made 
13. This has been illustrated the world around <Mazzeo 9 1984; 
Axline, 1977; Ballance et all, 1982; Belassa and StroutjesdiJk, 
1978; Castro, 1982) 
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in the past. Changes in the formal ownership of the mines did 
not sufficiently alter those decision-making processes to produce 
different results. Furthermore, the small size of many mining 
economies may render it difficult, if not impossible, for them, 
alone, to exert significant control over the international 
marketing networks dominated by transnational corporations. 
Unless they can link their mining sector into a regional 
industrialization strategy, their best option may be to treat it 
as a money-spinner, capturing and investing a major share of the 
surplus in a more modest national industrialization program to 
meet the peoples' needs. Self-evidently, this will work only 
where the mining venture is sufficiently profitable to attract a 
foreign partner while providing the government with an adequate 
share. 
Unless a government successfully alters the inherited 
processes determining the inputs, conversion and feedback in the 
mining companies, however, the mining sector and associated 
industries will not likely conform with plans designed to 
implement either a regionally or a nationally-oriented 
development strategy. National research and teaching centers 
like the Indian School of Mines could make a valuable 
contribution by investigating the k i nds of institutional changes 
that, in particular countries, would help to ensure these 
industries played a more positive role in national and regional 
development. 
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In the typical third world mining economy which relies on 
imported technologies and, to remain viable, must export at least 
some of its mineral output, foreign trade constitutes a second 
11 cornm.?..nd i ng height 11 • Examination of the decision-making 
structures characteristic of most nations' trading institutions, 
however, reveals features essentially similar to those of the 
mining firms. They often delegate control over this sector to 
private firms, frequently transnational corporate affiliates of 
the mining transnationals (cf. Cobbe, 1979). These typically 
decide not only whether, where and at what prices to market the 
minerals and, if any, the manufactures produced, but also what 
technologies and other input s to import for the mines and all 
ot h ~=t· sect cw s .. Many third world governments establish marketing 
boards for major agricultural exports, but Zimbabwe is one of the 
few governments that has set up such a board for minerals .. Most 
usually exercise indirect regulation, of exports, more or less 
in line with perceived national interests, through licensing, 
foreign exchange and tariffs.. In some countries, state trading 
companies compete with private importing firms, and in a 
relatively few cases have largely replaced them. In each 
national and regionala context~ researchers should exp l ore the 
particular constraints and r esources as a foundation for 
designing more approrpriat trading institutions and policies .. 
Financial institutions ~ which control the accumulation and 
-:c·.-i 
.. )L. 
reinvestment of a nation's investable surpluses, constitute the 
th i 1~d E•conomi c 11 command j_ ng hE•i ght 11 .. Financial institutions help 
determine how much of the surplus generated by the mines and 
other sectors is remitted abroad; and whether the share that 
remains is reinvested primarily to expand the mining sector, or 
in more balanced, integrated national or regional development. 
At independence, most developing country governments only 
intervened directly in the financial arena through the central 
bank and by taxing corporate incomes. They typically delegated 
the major decision-making role to private, often foreign, 
financial institutions: commercial banks, pension and insurance 
funds, and various kinds of investment banks. Even when 
governments acquired shares of ownership in some of these 
institutions, they frequently left key decisions to managers 
whose ties or predilections shaped decisions favorable to private 
rather than national interests <A .. Seidman, 1986a). 
Investigation of this third crucial area , should help discover the 
kinds of institutional changes required in any particular country 
to ensure re-allocation of investable surpluses to more 
self-reliant, balanced development capable of ensuring 
increasingly productive employment and rising living standards 
for all the nation's, or, better yet, all the region's 
:i. nha!::ii tant~s .. 
COl\ICL...US I 01\1 ~ 
In this brief talk, I have not attempted to shed new light on 
the role of the mining industry in third world development. 
Instead, I have tried to identify some of the lessons of past 
experience, and outline future research which could contribute to 
planning and implementing more effective strategies to 
incorporate mining into overall development. I have suggested 
that the relative failure of many governments' to enhance their 
mining sectors' contribution to national welfare lies only in 
part in the inadequacy of the changes they made in the inherited 
decision-making structures governing the mines' operation. 
Equally, if not more important, they seldom integrated the mines 
as poles of growth into long term plans to contribute to 
restructuring either their national or the regional economies. 
Not th a t political leaders and government officials have not 
called for sweeping changes in the dualistic externally dependent 
allocation of resources, including the mining sectors, that 
condemned their populations to poverty. Many have also united 
to call for regional cooperation. But they seldom implemented 
the necessary step-by-step alterations in the inherited sets of 
institutions governing their nations' economic 'commanding 
heights ' to carry out the proposed reallocation of resources at 
either the national or regional level. 
If this hypothesis is valid, it poses a challenge for third 
world teaching and research centers like the Indian School of 
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Mines. Their faculties and students can pioneer in investigating 
the practical step-by-step changes, not only in resource 
allocation, but also in key institutions to ensure that existing 
or proposed mining operations contribute to all aspects of 
national, and, in s ofar as possible, regional development. By 
participating in this kind of research, furthermore, the students 
in these centers will acquire the training and perspectives 
necessary to provide leadership in formulating and implementing 
plans to ensure that mineral wealth contributes to the spread of 
increasingly producti v e employment opportunities and rising 
living standard s for all the inhabitants of their nation, and 
perhaps even for the region. 
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